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EvrQENCE-PoLICE REGULATION BY RuLES OF EVIDENCE

I

"The judicial rules of Evidence," said their great expounder, "were
never meant to be an indirect process of punishment." 1 Yet twice the
Supreme Court has promulgated new rules of evidence for precisely
that purpose. The rule that evidence is inadmissible, regardless of its
relevance and materiality, if it was obtained by unreasonable search was
first suggested by Justice Bradley, who wrote the majority opinion in
Boyd v. United States in r886.2 The other rule was voiced in 1943 by
Justice Frankfurter, writing the majority opinion in McNabb v. United
States.8 And each rule demonstrates the inherent evil of judicial legislation which is based upon incomplete information and is formulated
without realization of its probable effects. ·
1
2
8

4 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed.,§ 2183 (1923).
II6 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886).
318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943).
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In the McNabb case it appeared that some of the defendents had
been arrested, on a charge of murder, at about two o'clock on a Thursday morning arid taken to a detention room in the local federal build·ing where they were kept, with nothing to sit on, until five in the afternoon. Then they were removed to the local jail. They were not
brought before a committing magistrate until some time on Saturday.
In the meantime they were repeatedly interrogated by federal officers
at considerable length. Various incriminating admissions and a confession thus elicited were used as evidence against them. This the Supreme
Court held to constitute error, and reversed the conviction because of
it.
The Court expressly refrained from a finding that the questioning
by the officers had amounted to "compulsion" to answer, in violation
of the constitutional privilege. Neither did the Court consider that the
admissions were properly excludable under any existing rule of evidence. "Quite apart from the Constitution," says the opinion; the
evidence was inadmissible merely because "in their treatment of the
petitioners the arresting officers assumed functions which Congress has
explicitly denied them." It was their duty to take the defendants "immediately" after arrest before the nearest United States commissioner,
or other committing officer. There was a "plain disregard of this duty."
Hence the opinion concludes-whether logically, or by non-sequitur
-"a conviction resting upon evidence secured through such a flagrant
disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be
allowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in
wilful disobedience of law."
Justice Reed dissented, saying, "If these confessions are otherwise
voluntary, civilized standards, in my opinion, are not advanced by setting aside these judgments because of acts of omission which are not
shown to have tended toward coercing the admissions."¼
The majority opinion was either carelessly vague, or it purposely
left open a wide area of interpretative application. It uses the phrases
"a plain disregard" or the duty enjoined by Congress; evidence obtained "in such violation" of legal rights; and evidence secured through
"such a flagrant disregard" of the proper procedures. This might indicate that the rule was not intended as an absolute preclusion of confessions obtained while the officers were in dereliction of duty, but only
when they were in "such," similarly gross, and "flagrant" dereliction.
But except for these occasional and seemingly casual phrasings, there is
nothing i1! the opinion to limit its application. Followed as it stands, it
sets up an ex~usionary rule of evidence far wider in its scope than- the
preclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search. Indeed it ex¼

Id. at pp. 341, 345 and 349.
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tends further than the exclusion unsuccessfully advocated by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis a generation ago in Olmstead v. United States,
that "apart from the Constitution the Government ought not to use
evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act." 5 The McNabb decision, logically applied, precludes use of evidence obtained by
police officers while acting in dereliction of duty, whether criminally or
not.
Thus the decision, either broadly or narrowly interpreted, propounds once again the wisdom of a judicial policy whicp. turns known
criminals loose upon society as a means of punishing the police.
2

Both the rule of the McNabb decision and the earlier rule excluding relevant evidence obtained by "unreasonable" search represent free
judicial choice of policy. The latter rule, proposed in the Boyd case,
adopted in Weeks v. United States in 1914,0 found no acceptance by
state courts and was virtually disregarded in the lower federal courts
until the advent of prohibition.7 But as one of prohibition's manifold
social e:ffects, the rule of exclusion thereafter found widespread and
enthusiastic adoption by state judges, and a renaissance in the federal
courts.
Ostensibly the rule is based upon a judicial assumption that the
constitutional prohibition of unreasonable search itself makes the evidence so procured inadmissible; the Constitution itself is asserted as
setting up a rule of evidence. But the fallacy of that assumption, the
necessary, even if unrealized, insincerity of the assertion, is evident
from the flatly contradictory, but equally sincere opinion of those same
courts prior to prohibition. It is essentially a rule of policy, chosen by
a score of state courts when new conditions urged its wisdom, and rejected by another score of ,other state courts despite similar constitutional provisions.8
"The Constitution of this state," said the Iowa court, "is identical
in its language with the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution .... The constitutional provision is a sacred right and one which
the courts will rigidly enforce; but that does not mean that the State,
in the prosecution of crime, cannot use any proper evidence available
to it, without stopping to conduct an independent inquiry in the criminal
5

277 U.S. 438 at 469-470, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1927).
232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914).
7
The few federal decisions which followed the rule of exclusion, and the numerous state decisions which repudiated it are collected in 4 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed.,
§ 2183, n. ff. (1923).
8
The lineup of states on this choice is noted, Atkinson, "Prohibition and the
Doctrine of the Weeks Case," 23 M1cH. L. REV. 748 (1925).
6
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proceeding as to how that evidence was obtained. Great public interests
are involved in the due and efficient prosecution of crime. The vital
question is whether or not the evidence is competent and relevant to
the issue on trial." 9
New York's Judge Cardozo also expressed emphatically the conclusion that the state Civil Rights Law could not be interpreted as making inadmissible evidence obtained by its violation. That the method of
obtaining the evidence in the particular case was a trespass, an unreasonable search, he conceded. "The officer might have been resisted, or sued
for damages, or even prosecuted for oppression." But of the usability
of the evidence he says, "We find nothing in the statute ( Civil Rights
Law, 8) whereby official trespasses and private ones are differentiated
in respect of the legal consequences to follow them. All that the statute
does is to place the two on an equality. In times gone by, officialdom
had arrogated to itself a privilege of indiscriminate inquisition. The
statute declares that the privilege shall not exist. Thereafter, all alike,
whenever search is unreasonable, must answer to the law. For the high
intruder and the low, the consequences become the same. Evidence is
not excluded because the private litigant who offers it has gathered it
by lawless force. By the same token, the State, when prosecuting an
offender against the peace and order of society, incurs no heavier liability ....
"The truth indeed is that the statute says nothing about consequences. It does no more thll;n deny a privilege. Denying this, it stops.
Intrusion without privilege has certain liabilities and penalties. The
statute does not assume to alter or increase them. No scrutiny of its
text can ever evoke additional consequences by a mere process of construction." 10
3
As ·a rule of policy, what is the policy; unless it be that of Wigmare's sardonic rhetoric? "Titus, you have been found guilty of
conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for
contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish
Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This
State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94 at 103 and 106, 191 N.W. 530 (1923).
People v. Defoe, 242 N.Y. 13 at 21 and 23, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
The federal Constitution, too, prohibits unreasonable search· by private p,ersons
as well as by government agents. If pretense that the constitutional provision itself sets
up a rule of evidence were sound, it would exclude evidence so obtained by either
private persons or officers. But the Supreme Court has interpreted it as not excluding
evidence resulting from unreasonable search by private pei:sons. Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574 (1921). The pretense of exclusion as a constitutional
9

· 10

requirement rather.than as a choice of policy is criticized; Harno, "Evidence Obtained

by Illegal Search and Seizure," 19

ILL.

L.

REV.

303 (1925).

'
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is our way of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and of teaching
people like Titus to behave, and incidentally of securing respect for
the Constitution. Our way ofupholding the Constitution is not to strike
at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else." 11
In one of the earliest state cases to adopt the federal rule, Chief
Justice Carrol expresses the policy thus: "In other words will courts
authorize and encourage public officers to violate the law and close their
eyes to methods that must inevitably bring the law into disrepute in
order that an accused may be found guilty? Will a high court of the
state say in effect to one of its officers that the Constitution of the state
prohibits a search of the premises of a person without a search warrant,
but if you can obtain evidence against the accused by so doing you may
go to his premises, break open the doors of his house and search it in
his absence, or over his protest if present, and this court will permit
the evidence so secured to go to the jury to secure his conviction? It
seems to us that a practice like this would do infinitely more harm than
good in the administration of justice." 12
The tenor, indeed, of every decision precluding use of the evidence clearly evinces a judicial purpose of enforcing respect for the
constitutional provision by rendering futile whatever is done in disregard of it.
4
Has this judicial policy of making rules of evidence for the purpose of regulating police practices really prevented "infinite harm" in
the administration of justice? Or has it in truth itself produced serious
harm? Did the judges choose their policy wisely?
When the New York court of appeals declined to follow the policy
of excluding evidence obtained by unreasonable search, it pointed out
that it would have followed it, if at all, only because of some demonstrated wisdom in the policy. "But," said the court, "adequate revelation of [ the wisdom of] such a policy is hard to see .••• The pettiest
police officer would have it in his power through overzeal or indiscre4 WIGMORE, EvmENCE, 2d ed., § 2184, p. 639 (1923).
In Owens v. State, 133 Miss. 753 at 757, 98 So. 233 (1923), where the rule of
exclusion was sustained by an evenly divided court, counsel for the defendant argued
frankly that such a rule "will have much effect in 'sobering' these officials [ circuit
courts and prosecuting officers] from the effect of the mania which possesses the masses
at the present time against person charged with violation of the prohibition laws."
"Will this Court by sustaining the judgment below [admitting the evidence]
sanction such conduct on the part of the Executive? The governing principle has
long been settled. It is that a court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its
aid has unclean hands." Brandeis, J., in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at
483, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1927).
12 Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152 at 166, 224 S.W. 860 (1920).
11
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tion to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious.
A room is searched ·against the law, and the body of a murdered man
is found. If the place of discovery may not be proved, the other circumstances may be insufficient to connect the defendant with the crime.
The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the murderer goes
free. Another search, once more against the law, discloses counterfeit
money, or the implements of forgery. The .absence of a warrant means
the freedom of the forger. Like instances can be multiplied. We may
not subject society to these dangers until the Legislature has spoken
with a clearer voice." 13
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Holmes' belief that there is a wise
public policy in exclusion of the evidence brought him to the poin~ of
discarding any pretence that the Constitution compels e.--i:clusion, and of
advocating that, entirely aside from constitutional restrictions, any evidence obtained unlawfully, whether by search or otherwise, be excluded. "I think," he said, "that apart from the Constitution the Government ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a
criminal act. There is no body of precedents by which we are bound,
and which confines us to logical deduction from established rules.
Therefore we must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we
cannot have, and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable
that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available
evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the Government
- should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the
means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for
having got evidence by crime I do not see why it may not as ·well pay
them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to
protestions of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose,
and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an ignoble part." 14
This judicial disagreement over the practical value, the social good,
of one policy- or the other, is not buttressed with data by the advocates
of either policy. Like so distressingly much of judicial law-making, it
seems to be predicated not upon research, not even upon careful evaluation of known data, but wholly upon the predilections of the particular
judges who have assumed that power to choose between competing
notions. It is not the choice of a scientist, not even of a social scientist;
it is at best the empirical reaction of individuals whose knowledge of
realities varies greatly. By no other, less condemnatory, theory can the
disparity of belief and divergence of judicial opinion be explained.
Until the excitements of prohibition the federal rule of exclusion stands
13
14

People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 at 23 and 24, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at 469-470, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1927).
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by itself in an isolation almost of obsolescence. Under the influence of
prohibition problems, a score of state courts adopt the federal rule, another score repudiate it. A vigorous minority in each state strongly
protests whichever rule is adopted. On the federal bench itself Holmes,
Brandeis, Butler and Stone take emphatic issue with Taft, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Sanford.15
Yet not one of these judicial statesman, choosing policies, making
law for the governance of society, asks for information of the realities
upon which to predicate his choice. No one would question the intelligence of a Holmes. But what knowledge of realities, of the practical
necessities of social protection through law enforcement, does even a
Holmes possess-after four decades in the ivory towered cloisters of
an appellate bench? Had so radical a rule of evidence been promulgated by Congress or a state legislature, without even pretence of committee study of facts or a request for information, its method of production would have been cursed by the police, castigated by the press
and condemned by the general public.

5
What little knowledge is in fact available, the few data that have
been dug from the coverage of unsupported but reiterated opinion,
persuasively support Cardozo's grave fear of social danger from the
exclusion rule. The policy of exclusion was designated and adopted to
the end of fostering proper police conduct through discouragement of
what is improper. If overzeal is made futile, so the assumption runs,
overzeal even for effective enforcement will diminish and cease. If lawless efforts are encouraged by success in the conviction of guilty criminals, they will flourish and increase. It is a logical enough theory,
impregnable in the library. But in the light of eventualities it appears
to have been dim-visioned theory spectacled in rose.
Not one shred of evidence has been discovered to indicate that the
police of Ohio and New York, where use of evidence is permitted, are
-worse behaved than the police of Michigan and Illinois, where it is
excluded. But to the contrary, there is ample and persuasive evidence
that the rule of exclusion, academically designed for improvement of
police methods, has in practical application conduced to serious police
misbehavior. If it did not actually beget the "tip-over raid," it nurtured that vicious practice to its evil florescence.
During the later years of prohibition the writer participated as a
spectator in numerous police raids on blind pigs. At one such place,
with the appearance of the police, most of the hooch disappeared down
a toilet bowl and bathtub outlet, though enough remained in bottles and
is

Id.
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in the customers' glasses to prove unlawful operation beyond peradventure. B_ut police sledges swung on bathtub, toilet bowl, bar, chairs and
tables; even the walls were damaged. So general was the destruction·
~hat the spectator protested. Replied the sergeant in charge: "How the
hell do you expect us to put this bird out of business unless we smash
him out?"
"Take him into court and let the court p-qt him out."
"You know damn well that if we take him into court they will
throw out the evidence and let him go. We've got no warrant."
"Why didn't you get a warrant?"
"No magistrate will issue a warrant on the preliminary dope we
can get." ·
.
On that point the situation was interesting. The place was a shabby
small house in a district of small shabby houses. The patrolmen on the
beat had observed the number of men and occasional women coming
and going from this particular house. Taxis, too, were far more frequent than either the house or the neighborhood would explain. This
information, passed on to the prohibition enforcement division, spoke
clearly enough to their ear-s. But, rightly or wrongly, it spoke less '
persuasively to magistrates charged with responsibility for issuing warrants. For the police to "make a buy" in such places was singularly
difficult-difficult enough to satisfy the writer, without going into long
explanation here, that as a mea,ns of obtaining warrants it was impracticable. The net consequence was a police alternative of "harassing''
some piggers out of busin~s, or of letting more of them operate. When
asked why they chose the first, the police answered that the press was
already bedeviling them intolerably for alleged inefficiency in closing
the joints.
Eventually the tip-over procedure miscarried; an incompetently
led squad smashed property whose owner was in a position to protest,
and the procedure became public knowledge. The officers involved in
the particular raid were punished: But the commissioner of police
frankly admitted that he had given orders to his men to smash the bars
and fixtures of blind pigs and saloons. S_ome days later the mayor
directed revocation of that order, whereupon this illuminating editorial
appeared in a local paper:
"Well, my buddies,, the expected has happened, even though the
boys were beginning to despair during the last few weeks. What I refer
to is opening up of the old town, the polishing up of the glasses, and the
twisting of the spigots? [The revocation of the order] has unscrewed
the municipal lid, which was clamped down hard by Police Commissioner Wilcox in the dark days following the Buckley killing. It is
responsible for the taking of the bartenders' aprons down from the
shelf. It has effectively tied the hands of the Detroit police depart-
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ment, so far as enforcement of the prohibition laws is concerned, by
causing the abolition of the so-called 'tip-over' raids on blind pigs .•., .
Whatever we may think of that method of enforcing laws, it was effective .... The raids themselves sufficed to put fear into the hearts of
the wet proprietors and probably did more than anything else to increase the town's aridity." 16
No "smash and grab" procedure, no lawless police practice, however effective, is commendable; perhaps never excusable. But these
particular ones, ironically enough, were the actual, evil product of
judge-made rules logically, but untutoredly, designed to decrease unlawful police activity. So far as the writer can ascertain no similar
practice flourished in the neighboring Ohio city of Toledo, where the
rule of exclusion did npt obtain and conviction in the courts was practicable.11
6

But these were not the only evils resulting from the judge-made
rule of exclusion. Though matured in liquor cases, it could not, of
course, be confined to them. The Illinois court early reversed a conviction for receiving stolen property because the defendant's premises
had been searched without a warrant. 18 Michigan courts quickly applied
the rule to evidence of carrying concealed weapons. Here it well nigh
blocked the machinery of social protection. During a period when robbery and armed assault were rife in Detroit, the writer was struck by
the number of obviously guilty gun-toters-a felony in Michigan,
punishable by five years imprisonment-who were picked up by the
police and promptly released to go their threatening ways. Through
the courtesy of Commissioner James Watkins he was enabled to study
the reasons for these releases. Without going into detail here, suffice
it to say that during one year I ,347 robberies with arms were reported,
237 persons were prosecuted for the felony of carrying concealed
weapons and only 134 were convicted.
In nine of the failures to convict, the accused had jumped bail; in
other cases the weapon had been found on the floor of an automobile,
without evidence as to which of the occupants had possessed it; three
defendants were sent to insane asylums; a razor was held not to be a
concealed weapon. But in forty-one instances at least the prosecution
had been dismissed because the trial judge held the arrest unlawfulbecause made on suspicion only-the consequent search "unreasonable,"
and the evidence thereby procured inadmissible. In a large number of
Detroit Saturday Night, Nov. 22, 1930.
At least not until relatively recently, when the hegira of gamblers from city to
county, and their protests at unfair treatment by the municipal police, suggest that
Toledo may be emulating the earlier Detroit example.
18 People v. Brocamp, 307 III. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
16
17
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other instances arrests did not even reach the stage of accusation; the
offenders were discharged by order of the superintendent because it was
obvious, from experience, that the courts would not permit use of the
evidence., All told, it is safe to say that at least one-fourth of all the
. guilty gun-toters discovered and arrested during that year escaped any
penalty, not because they were innocent, but solely because .of the
judge-made rule that evidence of their guilt could not be used.10 So
intolerable was the, evil that the people of Michigan amended their
constitution to end it.
No one appears to have investigated the number of liquor law violators and other criminals released for similar reasons; nor have similar releases in other cities been compiled. The total number, however,
must run into appallingly high figures.
Thus the judicial rule of evidentiary inadmissibility, as it operated
in reality, defeated its~ own purposes. As a practical matt~r, it fostered,
rather than diminished, lawless police practices. And because of it, the
"few criminals" whom Justice Holmes thought might es.cape justice if
his even more exclusionary proposal were adopted, .have become in fact
thousands-liquor law violators, dope peddlers, carriers of concealed
weapons, receivers of stolen property, swindlers, thieves, robbers and
burglars.

7The rule of the McNabb case was promulgated too recently for its
pra:ctical effect to be yet demonstrated. But its probabilities are not
undiscernable. In the subsequent ca'Se of United States v. Klee 20 it
appeared that the defendant had been brought before a United States
commissioner within two hours after arrest. In the meantime he had
freely admitted his guilt. After that confession, but before trial, the
McNabb decision was made public. Klee's attorneys thereupon raised
objection to the use of his confession in evidence and rested the objection on the McNabb rule. Judge Schwellenbach finally decided to admit the evidence because so short a period had elapsed between arrest
and "arraignment" before the commissioner. But he was disturbed by
19 The details of this investigation are discussed, Waite, "Public Policy and the
Arrest of Felons," 31 M1cH. L. REv. 749 (1933).
It is interesting to note that though the exclusion rule prevented sequestration
from social freedom of the dangerous individuals, its component proposition that tangible evidence obtained by unreasonable search must be returned was successfully ignored
by the police. Though the offenders were released, they were released without their
weapons. The adoption of the exclusion rule in Michigan resulted from the insistance of
a minor politician that unlawfully possessed, and not lawfully possessable, liquor be returned to him-a motion granted by court order. People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich.
559, 171 N.W. 557 (1919). But apparently none of these unlawful weapon carriers
thought wise to ask a court order for the return of their weapons.
20 (D.C. Wash. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 679.
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the McNabb opinion sufficiently to make a seven page explanation as
to how his case escaped its effect. Had the delay in the Klee case been
two days instead of two hours he would have felt, obviously, that the
absolutely uncoerced and voluntary confession could not be used. Any
period longer than two hours but less than two days would have produced uncertainty, controversy, delay and belated justice at best, evasion of justice frequently.
The danger has already been protested by officials responsible for
effective law enforcement. The rule of the McNabb case was tentatively incorporated into the proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recently submitted for consideration by the Bar. Section A of
proposed Rule 5 required that any officer who makes an arrest "shall
without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before the nearest
available commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons
charged with offenses ...." This was merely restatement of the already
existing law. But section B of the rule went further and incorporated
the substance of the McNabb decision, saying: "No statement made by
a defendant in response to interrogation by an officer or agent of the
government shall be admissible in evidence against him if the interrogation occurs while the defendant is held in custody in violation of this
rule."
The response to the proposal, when it appeared in the form of admitted rule-making, instead of the cryptic legislation of judicial decision, was prompt and vigorous. Federal judges, discussing the problem
at their conferences, pointed out that the ru1e would penalize an offending officer not at all; would merely throw upon society a risk.of ineffective enforcement. Some recognized the McNabb decision as law, but
deprecated its crystallization into an acknowledged rule; others questioned the force of the decision itself; all disapproved the rule as
proposed. Federal district attorneys were even more critical; one expressed the sentiments of others thus: "Rule 5 (b) is an attempt to
petrify into a rule the unfortunate decision contained in United States v.
McNabb. The McNabb decision was judicial legislation and not interpretation. The common law was and is that contained in the dissenting opinion. The law should remain as it was before the McNabb
decision. The undersigned feels that the court in that decision and the
Rules Committee had a high theoretical purpose, but lost sight of crime
statistics and a realistic appreciation of crime detection ...."
·
As a'spokesman of crime detection officials, J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, protested that the rule,
"would handicap law enforcement, would be contrary to public interest, and would serve only the criminal whose advantages seem to be
paramount to the public welfare in the suggested procedural requirement." Continuing, he said:
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"3. The requirements set forth in the two sections of the proposed Rule 5, in many instances, would serve to defeat the ends of
justice. Modern criminals seldom operate alone and this is par...
ticularly true with regard to the more serious violations of kidnaping, bank robbery and other similar crimes of violence. Immediate arraignment of the :first member of a criminal gang who is
arrested, with the resultant public record and publicity, would
frustrate plans of enforcement officers to apprehend the other in.:.
dividuals and con~pirators involved. The result would be a vast
additional expenditure of money and the very definite possibility
of an increase in the number of law enforcement officers killed by
criminals. The situation becomes more aggravated in cases involving spy rings and sabotage gangs. The immediate arraignment of
the :first spy arrested would jeopardize the entire investigation and
cause the other conspirators to flee and would further jeopardize
the Nation's security. Expediency rather than immediacy should
be a determining'factor in deciding how soon in the public interest
an individual taken into custody should be arraigned. Examples
of such cases where a literal interpretation under the proposed rule
would not be in the public interest are cited as follows:
"(f) The Kidnaping of Edward George Bremer, St. Paul,
Minnesota, January z7, z934. The use of expediency as a measuring rod in determining the time of arraignment played a very
vital part in smashing the Barker-Karpis gang which was responsible for the Bremer kidnaping and numerous other flagrant
violatio,ns of our laws. In two raids conducted in Chicago on January 8, 1935, Special Agents of the FBI took into custody, among
others, Arthur "Doc" Barker and William Bryan Bolton. These
two i11dividuals were taken immediately to the Chicago Office of
the-FBI and held until arraignment was expedient.
"Bolton gladly cooperated with the FBI, furnishing the location of the Bremer hideout, intimate details of the kidnaping and
also the location of other members of the Barker-Karpis gang in
Florida. A map was also found in Barker'_s apartment which gave
· helpful information on the Florida angle.
'
"As a result of the policy followed with respect to Barker and
Bolton, Special Agents were able to locate the hideout of Ma
Barker and her son Fred, near Ocala, Florida. Both were slain on
January 16, 1935, when they resisted arrest. Bolton was removed
to St. Paul on January 20. "Doc" Barker had been delivered to
the United States Marshall at St. Paul two days before. An indictment against some members of the ring had been returned on May
4, 1934, but on January 22, 1935, a superseding indictment was
returned.·
·
"(g) Robbery of St. Charles National Bank, St. Charles, Illi-
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nois, January 3z, z936. Four men, armed with revolvers and shotguns, entered the above bank during the early morning hours,
bound and gagged the employees and forced them to lie on the
floor, and escaped with loot totaling $14,148.60. After widespread investigation by Special Agents of the FBI in Illinois and
neighboring states, one Philip Dimenza was identified as one of the
perpetrators of this crime. He was located at his home in Chicago
and taken into custody at 2:30 P.M. on February 12, 1936. Under
a literal interpretation of the word "immediately," Dimenza
would have been arraigned just as soon as possible on the afternoon of his arrest. Instead, however, as a matter of expediency,
he was taken to the Chicago office of the FBI where he voluntarily
remained for a time in the custody of Special Agents. He readily
admitted his participation in the bank robbery, named his associates and furnished other pertinent information.
"Special Agents and police were stationed at Dimenza's home,
and at approximately II:oo A.M., February 13, 1936, Fred Hansen, another of the bank robbers, called and was taken into
custody. At 1 :oo P.M. on the same date two others implicated were
arrested at the home, while at 7:00 P.M. still another bank robber
put in his appearance and was taken into custody. A few days after
the arrests, and before arraignment, the arsenal of the gang consisting of some sixteen fancy weapons was located.
"An authorized complaint was filed against the bank robbers on
February 18, 1936, and preliminary hearings given those arrested.
It is obvious that an immediate arraignment of Dimenza would
have frustrated completely the early arrests of the others involved.
~'All United States attorneys with whom this proposed rule has
been discussed by representatives of the FBI are opposed to its
adoption." 21
8

Here, then, we have two attempts of the judiciary to control police
conduct by the indirection of rules of evidence judicially made for that
purpose. One rule has not only failed lamentably of its purpose, but has
created seriously evil consequences of its own. The other rule gives
21 From a letter of Mr. Hoover to the Secretary of the Committee by which the
proposed rule was drafted, and quoted here with Mr. Hoover's permission to the present
writer. The letter itself contains several other cases where the McNabb rule, if adhered
to, might have prevented incarceration of extremely dangerous criminals; e.g. "The
Kansas City Massacre," "The Eight German Saboteurs," "The Ludwig Case," "The
Kidnapers of Charles Sherman Ross, 1937."
Since Mr. Hoover's letter, the National Sheriffs' Association has protested the
rule as "resulting in other miscarriages of justice," and a bill to repudiate it has been
introduced in Congress. Ass. Press dispatch, Nov. 22, 1943.
The objectionable provision was omitted from the Rules as eventually submitted
to the Supreme Court.
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promise of harm, without compensating hope of benefit. Each rule is
perfect exemplification of Justice Brandeis' comment that "knowledge
is essential to understanding; and understanding should precede
judging." 22
Control of police activity by direct action has been called impracticable and its impracticality has been asserted as justification for indirection.28 Whether that be offered as a real reason, or merely a good reason,
is immaterial; in either event its persuasiveness depends wholly upon
the truth of its premise. And at best that premise is dubious, unsupported by producible data. To assume the ineffectiveness of direct action by suit against an overzealous officer merely from the absence of
such suits in appellate court reports is unjustifiable; the relation of
appeals to suits begun depends too largely upon the nature of the action; these may be so simple and successful as to provoke no appeal.
That no guilty gun-carrier has ever brought suit for damages may be
conceded; he would find small sympathy before a jury. Should criminal prosecution ever be instituted against the officer who "unlawfully"
arrests an actually guilty felon, it is likely that no jury would convict
and few appellate courts would affirm if the jury did convict. As for
unlawful arrest of innocent persons, the writer has seen overzealous
policemen sweating copiously in fear of results and has known judgments rendered against them. If suits are not begun, it is far more
likely that no real damage was suffered than that suit would be unsuccessful.
Moreover it should not be forgotten that civil action by the individual injured is not the only alternative for enforcing observance of
official obligations and limitations. An unlawful arrest or search of the
person may, and usually would, constitute also a criminal assault. An
inexcusable delay in taking the arrested person before a magistrate as
required by statute would surely be subject to the sanctions of malfeasance in office. It is doubtful that police officers, sheriffs, or marshals could be dealt with directly by the courts for contempt of court
in their unlawful, or recalcitrant activities. But certainly they could be
. subjected, as a practicable matter, to proceedings instituted by court
prosecutors or district attorneys. And those latter officials would not be
indifferent to insistan'.ce by the judiciary that unlawful police activities
be so dealt with.
Were judges half so astute in the instigation and judicial support of
Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 at 520, 44 S. Ct. 412 (1924).
One might add another remark of Brandeis, quoted without reference in 27 J.
AM. Juo. Soc. 117 ( 1943) that "The intellectual tends to breadth of view; the practical to that realization of limitations which are essential to the wise conduct of life."
28 e.g., Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures," 25 CoL. L. REv. II at 22 (1925), "However it may have been
formerly, it is every day observation that neither [ civil suit nor criminal prosecution]
is -aaequate at present."
22
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direct proceedings against offending police officers as they are ready
with the easier indirection of releasing criminals, they would far more
satisfactorily enforce respect for constitutions-and would preserve the
public safety as well.
But in any event, conceding that the greater effectiveness of direct
action is unprovable by available evidence ( chiefly because it has not
been tried), nevertheless the indirect process of rebuking policemen by
turning criminals loose upon the public has proved itself to be both
ineffective and dangerous. A reversion by the courts from the certain
harmfulness of their indirect methods to the possibly uncertain advantages of reliance upon direct methods could not fail to profit society.
Unfortunately the rule excluding evidence obtained by unreasonable search has been so often reiterated as to make judicial admission
that it was an unwise choice of policy almost inconceivable. Yet the
e:ffects of even this rule can be ameliorated by judicial alteration in the
connotation of "unreasonable." The irrational assertion of Agnello v.
United States that "the search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unseasonable," 24 might well be modified by the logic of
Carroll v. United States 25 that when a warrant cannot be obtained without risking disappearance of the evidence, search without a warrant may
be reasonable. In a score of other applications, the rule of exclusion,
without need for repudiation, could be modified to suit both the realities of social safety and the practical preservation of individual liberty.26
The potential evils of that other judge-made rule, so recently promulgated and not yet firmly established by repetition, could easily be
dissipated by reconsideration and frank repudiation-a procedure for
which the court has shown itself to be great enough in the recent decisions of Murdock v. Pennsylvania 21 and West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.28
John Barker Waite*
269 U.S. 20 at 32, 46 S. Ct. 4 (1925).
267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925).
26 The essential significance of "unreasonable" as now used by the courts is discussed, Waite, "Searches and Seizures-The Criterion of Reasonableness," 42 MICH.
L. REv. 147 (1943). The wisdom of holding an arrest to be reasonable when the
arrested person is in truth guilty of felony and should have been arrested is discussed,
Waite "Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons," 31 MICH. L. REV. 749 (1933).
27 318 U.S. 748, 63 S. Ct. 870 (1943), reversing Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S.
584, 62 S. Ct. 1312 (1942).
28 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178 (1943, reversing Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S. Ct. 110 (1940).
As other precedents for reversal of an unwise decision after discovering additional
information, see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1940), reversing Hammer v. Dagenhilrt, 247 U.S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1917); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1936), reversing Adkins v. Childrens
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 53 S. Ct. 394 (1922).
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
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